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The Role of Evaluation in Democracy: 
Can it be Strengthened by Evaluation Standards? 





Evaluation should make a contribution to the further development of politics and society. 
Evaluation is itself a productive factor in democratic societies and is obliged to function 
according to its goals and rules. 
The general theme around this paper is to discuss possibilities to enhance the contribution that 
evaluation can make to foster democratic governance. I will address a very small aspect of this 
big issue. My perspective will be on evaluation as a profession and a community which is on the 
way to establishing its position in modern democracies, supported by making explicit its own 
standards for good evaluation practice.  
The Position of Evaluation in Democracy  
There are many factors influencing the position of evaluation in the democratic process; some of 
them are: 
 The legal and constitutional bases for evaluation (for example article 170, included in the 
Swiss constitution in 1999, introduces evaluation as an obligatory task of the federal 
assembly; see Bussmann 2006) 
 The responsiveness of government, administration, political parties to empirically based 
conclusions and recommendations (competition versus consensus oriented democracy...) 
 The degree in which outcome orientation and programming is a natural part of public 
administration procedures and is called in from service providers who are publicly 
financed 
                                            
* This article is based on the keynote speech given at 6th biennial conference “Governance, Democracy and 
Evaluation,” 30 September 2004 - 02 October 2004, Berlin, Germany. [http://www.europeanevaluation.org] 
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 The available units in the governmental system that execute evaluation institutionally 
(Auditor-Generals offices, parliamentary administration...) 
 The anchorage of a public discourse, which can be different in democracies with 
plebiscite elements and high decentralization vs. democracies strongly centralised and/or 
political parties with great influence on government 
 The accessibility of information in the public system; both the accessibility of data and 
the accessibility of evaluation reports, especially if these are financed publicly (freedom 
of information/ publics’ right to know)  
 The supply of evaluation training and studies, particularly in higher education 
institutions, or relevant courses in political science and public administration studies, etc. 
 Dissemination of evaluations in everyday areas of life like school, social services, labour 
market 
All these factors are either not at all or merely in the long run influenceable by the actions of the 
evaluation community. 
A community of evaluators and other experts interested in evaluation, such as the European 
Evaluation Society (EES) or the national evaluation societies in Europe, has restricted resources 
and possibilities of influencing these factors via information, exchange of experience, and 
training, professional standards. Today I want to stress particularly quality guidelines, principles 
or standards as a framework for the professional quality of evaluation and a basis to 
communicate the mission of evaluation to the actors of the political system and to the society in 
general.  
To think about evaluation standards is also triggered by risks that evaluation is exposed to. These 
risks, in the long run, threaten its position in support of democratic policy-making. 
Risks for evaluation in this important role become obvious as following: 
 Public commissioners: They engage internal units or external companies to do evaluation. 
These carry out the evaluation in a way in which commissioners themselves, the media, 
or the political opposition discover quite obvious shortcomings. 
 Evaluators: As an evaluator you hand in a tender which satisfies heavy quality demands. 
The public commissioner decides in favour of the cheapest supplier. Professional 
requirements on evaluations are known neither to the commissioner nor to the supplier. 
 Stakeholders/citizens: As persons affected by evaluation results they doubt the precision 
and the fairness as soon as conclusions and recommendations have been shared. They 
don't find any basis on which they can check the quality of the evaluations carried out. 
 As evaluation community: Evaluation is in competition to other professions: for example, 
auditing, controlling, or quality management. These have clear international or European 
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and widely published quality criteria for the services they deliver. They advertise with 
these quality codes and thus try to create confidence in the effectiveness of their 
approaches. 
These are some factors which endanger the credibility and the position of evaluation.  
What would be simpler in this situation than the following solution? The evaluation community 
ratifies a clear set of rules which are highly obligatory if individuals or organisations want to 
belong to this community. It is a mandatory base for training and academic graduation in 
evaluation. Even courts can refer to these written rules in disputes; accreditation/certification of 
evaluators or evaluation institutes and also systematic meta-evaluation or evaluation audits can 
build on this framework.  
The outlined solution is based on the assumption that evaluation is a profession like any other: A 
validated specialized knowledge is available which must be proven again and again; there are 
obligatory guidelines; certifications which have to be paid for, courts of arbitration, and so on. 
Of course, some widely held beliefs about evaluation speak against such a solution: There are 
different perspectives on what constitutes high-quality evaluation. Respect for particularities and 
differences are part of what evaluation has come to signify. Europe contains diverse societies, 
each with its unique political traditions and cultures, understandings of democracy, and ideas 
about the role of evaluation in a democracy.  
We are facing a dilemma: The evaluation community in an expanding unified Europe urgently 
needs a strong identity, a shared and clearly communicated self-image. As evaluation experts the 
members of the community are aware of the difficulties to arrive at internationally agreed upon 
joint principles or standards that adequately reflect multicultural and pluralist political contexts.  
Is this an unsolvable dilemma? Or is there a way out to escape these contradictory demands?  
I would like to share with you now some thoughts on these questions.  
Evaluation Standards in Europe: A Short Overview 
I would like to begin with a short remark on terminology: It has often been argued that it is 
arbitrary whether to use the term guideline, principle, or standard to address the norms or rules 
we are talking about. This position is also expressed by the denomination of the EES working 
group “on evaluation standards, guidelines and principles.” I will follow the example of the 
working group, which selected the term “standard” provisionally as the working term, including 
any relevant document that has another title. 
In many countries of Europe by now there exist guidelines or standards for evaluation. I list 
some of them briefly and characterize them with a few words. There are numerous specialists 
present at this biennial EES conference that have intensively discussed and analyzed these 
different standard sets. You are invited to study the contributions of these experts and to use 
them fruitfully in the ensuing discussions (i.e. Widmer, 2004a, 2004b). 
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 The Swiss Evaluation Society (founded in 1996) has approved the SEVAL Evaluation 
Standards in its general assembly in 2001. 
 The German Evaluation Society (founded in 1997) ratified its DeGEval-Standards also in 
2001. 
 The French Evaluation Society (SFE, established in 1999) presented a Charter of 
evaluation guiding principles for public policies and programmes in 2003. 
 The UK Evaluation Society (which was the first European Society, founded in 1994) 
adopted “The Guidelines for Good Practice in Evaluation” also in 2003. 
This list is not complete. It concentrates on standard sets of European evaluation societies which 
have all been established in a process characterized by strong membership participation, 
including hearings, expert groups, and discussions at annual conferences and so on. Other 
examples include the Italian Evaluation Association that developed a document parallel to its 
founding process in 1997 and there are also Standards laid out by the Finnish Evaluation Society. 
The Spanish evaluation community is also thinking about standards or guidelines (Bustelo, 
2004). 
There are other important sources explaining the requirements for good evaluations: 
 The EC Evaluation Standards and Good Practice Guidelines are an important element of 
an evaluation guide, published in by the European Commission - DG Budget (2003). 
 The MEANS collection (European Commission - DG Regional Policy 1999) included 
standards in eight dimensions. In this tradition 44 “Golden Rules” were published about 
good evaluation practice of socio-economic development programs within the four 
chapters of “The Guide”, internet-published by the European Commission – DG Regional 
Policy (2003). This is an internet based comprehensive evaluation handbook sponsored 
by the DG Regional Policy. 
There are many other guidelines and standards, some of them explicitly formulating 
requirements for evaluations in distinct evaluation fields. On the European level there are for 
example the Guidelines for the Evaluation of Drug Prevention, published by the European 
Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA, 1998). In Austria a group of 
experts developed Standards for technology and research evaluation, accompanied with 
checklists, guidelines for terms of reference and many other tools (FTEVAL, 2003). In 
Switzerland for instance the Evaluation Management & Resource Centre within the Swiss 
Federal Office of Public Health has published the Guidelines for Health Programme & Project 
Evaluation Planning (CCE, 1997). Also national Auditors-Generals offices continually work on 
norms and guidelines how to integrate effectively the evaluation function. 
Whereas most sets of standards claim applicability to evaluands in all sectors (private, state and 
third sector) some focus on public activities, as the SFE Charter and also the EC Standards and 
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Good Practice Guidelines (Widmer, 2004a). An important focus is on programmes1 as evaluation 
objects but also on experimental legislation and other interventions or actions of public or private 
bodies. SEVAL- and DeGEval-Standards also apply to organisations/institutions and policy 
systems (as for example a state-wide higher education system). They apply to a wide variety of 
evaluation fields, including education, health, social services, consumer protection, research, 
criminal justice, development cooperation, human rights, gender mainstreaming or social 
inclusion strategies and so on and so on. And they apply to (programs of) governmental bodies, 
Parafisci, market enterprises and to various kinds of third sector collectives such as social 
welfare organisations, foundations or any non-governmental organisations.  
Why this long list? I want to underline that there is much common ground for standards in 
Europe, standards that have a kind of an umbrella function, covering many fields of evaluation, 
types of evaluands, within and outside the control of public authorities. So most of them are not 
specifically established with the explicit aim to guide evaluations within democratically 
controlled systems, but they are well suited to fulfil this task and they comprise many elements 
which specifically adapt evaluations to the traditions, needs and procedures of democratic 
societies. 
To draw one first conclusion: Within many of the European countries there is obviously a great 
need for evaluation standards and guidelines. Some of the national evaluation societies have 
already ratified—often preceded by a broadly arranged participatory process—bodies of norms 
or standards. These might have an effect on evaluation culture, primarily in the public sector. 
Public authorities themselves—on the European as well as on the national (maybe at the 
regional) level—also develop and optimize rules and guidelines for evaluation, which are 
sometimes specific to distinct evaluation fields. 
As a response the EES-board has recently started to develop a policy on standards, guidelines, 
codes and principles in evaluation. On the EES Web pages a draft paper by Thomas Widmer is 
published which includes three essentials regarding the cooperation between EES and national 
evaluation societies concerning standards, guidelines and principles: 
 Promotion: that is, information on standard setting procedures employed by various 
national evaluation societies in Europe and other organisations as well as public 
authorities 
 Exchange: instead of development of ‘their own’ EES standards facilitation of mutual 
exchange 
 Plurality: No preference for any kind of standards, guidelines and so on but openness to 
ongoing developments. 
At the EES conference, there were some sessions organised by the recently established standing 
EES working group on “standards.” As I read in the abstracts booklet there are many informed 
                                            
1 Programme as a generic term comprising for example education or training curricula, European structural funds 
measures, prevention interventions, media campaigns, and so on. 
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specialists who do presentations on this theme, so that you can get in-depth information on 
various important aspect of this ongoing debate. 
Obviously the EES has chosen—as in many other areas and conforming to its statutes and 
philosophy—to play a subsidiary role in the question of standards for evaluation in Europe.  
To me there is a tension between great enthusiasm for many different sets of standard, 
guidelines, and principles, expressing cultural and policy field diversity, on the one hand, and, on 
the other hand, there is the threat of segmentation of a quite small professional community in 
Europe, as a consequence of a swarm of different papers (specialized on evaluation fields, on 
kind of evaluation...), with only slightly different orientation but varying terminology. This 
results in the need to build elaborate translation glossaries and transformation grids to avoid 
provoking misunderstandings constantly.  
In the remainder of this paper I want to discuss some arguments against standards, list some of 
their potential benefits, reframe some of the objections from a utilisation perspective, and 
highlight the question of values consideration in evaluation and its standards. 
Arguments Against Evaluation Standards 
There are many objections to standards for evaluation. For the most part they express fears that 
should be taken seriously. However, I see a danger that these objections are also sometimes 
expressed for reasons of political correctness. Of course it is an important issue to be aware of 
cultural diversity, different evaluation traditions, questions of gender and ethnicity when 
formulating guidelines for good evaluations. Of course we will never find a perfect standard set 
that fits all possible evaluation tasks and socio-political contexts equally. I believe it is important 
to discuss these issues and find the best solution, written down and communicated to the 
evaluation community and to the public. 
Objections against standards are based on distinct interests and values; it is the same for 
arguments in favour of standards. These defences and objections apply to the central value 
claims (as Ernest House would call them) of the evaluation profession, art or science (alternative 
names for what we do, which also include value claims) itself. It would lead too far here to 
address all of them. I only want to list some of them exemplars: 
a) The same set of standards does not fit into substantially different political cultures. 
Strongly centralised democracies need other evaluations than decentralised ones; the 
same is true for consensus-oriented democracies on the one hand, conflict-oriented 
democracies on the other hand; democracies with full time professional members of 
parliament have another evaluation utilisation mechanism than others with mostly 
volunteer politicians; there are small political systems with less than 1 million inhabitants 
and others with more than 30 million. 
b) Standards do not handle value questions adequately, which are the essence of evaluation. 
Sometimes they ask for transparency of values, interests and resulting evaluation criteria. 
But is this enough? We know that distinct interests and values shape evaluation contracts, 
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evaluation questions, interpretations and the utilisation of evaluation findings. Standards 
often give no clear orientation as to which is the sound way to identify and justify values, 
which way conforms to ethical or to democratic principles. Value-ignorant standards 
would be seen as a surrender of evaluation itself. 
c) Existing standards often have a strong bias concerning distinct kinds or settings of 
evaluation that is implicit and not explained openly: Some of the best known standard 
sets are written from the (idealised) perspective of an external independent evaluator 
removing the preconditions of internal and self evaluations. Others privilege evaluations 
done within democratically controlled settings as in the public sector, neglecting the 
requirements of evaluation done for the private sector. 
d) Maybe standards can improve the work executed by evaluators, at least a little bit, but 
they merely pretend that evaluation has a big influence on the decision makers and 
program directors. Standards make no sense if commissioners say no to broad 
stakeholder identification, to transparency of values, or to disclosure of findings—which 
is not a single standing event, at least in my own evaluation practise. Standards—a 
toothless paper tiger? 
e) There is no standard set thinkable that is suitable for all audiences. Some evaluators need 
clear instructions, maybe in technical language, how to execute evaluations, others 
dislike. So for them maybe adequate standards should be organised along the phases of 
evaluation starting with tender/offer and ending with follow up/meta-evaluation. Clients 
on the other hand urgently need regulations concerning contracts, as well as costs and 
benefits of evaluation. Politicians mainly need information about credibility and 
impartiality of evaluations. The general public wants a short text that is easy to 
understand so that an illustrative picture of good evaluation arises. 
f) Standard sets often include several single standards that contradict each other: For 
example political viability/diplomatic conduct as precondition for feasibility of 
evaluations/the survival of the evaluator as a contractor on the one hand, 
independence/isolation from vested interests as precondition of a fair and complete 
assessment of a credible/honest evaluator on the other hand. The argument is: If not all 
standards are applicable, evaluation practice becomes ethically and professionally 
puzzled—such kinds of standards would encourage an arbitrary evaluation practice and 
would be counterproductive to its own mission. 
g) Finally, there is the claim that standards impede innovation, because they fix in a 
prescriptive way what is good practice and what is bad practice/not allowed. Rigorous 
guidelines could thus hinder progress in evaluation theory or research methods. Members 
of the evaluation community who strictly adhere to the guidelines would tend to overlook 








Benefits and Uses of Evaluation Standards 
There are many benefits promised by supporters of evaluation standards. I want to mention some 
of them: Standards… 
 Foster the dialogue between the evaluation community and the general public, politicians 
and administrators about the potential role of evaluation in democracy and society; 
 Support the creation of an evaluation culture in public administrations and private 
organisations as well; 
 Strengthen the identity of evaluation as a profession, art and/or science; 
 Provide evidence on the progress of evaluation theory, its key terms and concepts and at 
the same time promote theoretical and methodological development;  
 By incorporating key definitions of evaluation language, such as “values,” “interests,” 
“stakeholder,” “audience,” “target group,” “criteria,” “indicators”…make communication 
about evaluation easier and more precise;  
 Provide a framework to shape the relations between clients/commissioners, 
directors/program managers and evaluation teams; and clarify their roles; 
 Serve as textbooks for evaluation training; give novices clear orientation on their way to 
mastery; allow evaluation experts to assess their degree of professionalism and to identify 
developmental needs; and 
 Function as a practical guide on how to do an evaluation, step-by step within its main 
phases (defining evaluation purpose and questions, collecting and valuing empirical 
information, communicating and reporting findings). 
This list sounds promising. The problem is that we have no empirical evidence about the effects 
of standards, their measured utilisation, their counter-effects and their cost-benefit relationship.  
I cannot fill this gap—as an unsatisfactory substitute I would like to present the first results of an 
online survey concerning the DeGEval-Standards (see DeGEval 2004). These findings lead me 
to the idea that different intended uses of evaluation standards need to be adequately reflected in 
a standards text, in addition to providing the standards in specific, audience-tailored formats, for 
example for politicians or the general public as the primary intended users.  
Some words about the Online-survey: The questionnaire was put online in spring of 2004. Two-
hundred fifty-seven people participated. As a result of the dissemination paths of the invitation to 
participate—mainly by E-Mail, also a snow-ball procedure—about 55% of the respondents are 
DeGEval-members; that is about 30% of the total membership. The main purpose of the inquiry 
was to get feedback from evaluation specialists about the timing and scope of a revision process 
of the DeGEval-Standards, but also to gains some evidence about kinds of their utilisation. The 
results will be published at the end of 2004. 
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Question 4 of the survey asks the following: “In which regard are the standards useful for your 
work? Would you please outline briefly for which purposes you use the standards.” Most of the 
answers reflected in the following analysis belong to question 4. Some belong to other related 
open ended questions (asking for the preferred way to do the revision process or for arguments to 
choose one of them—confusing, leave out if possible). 
































The first idea to structure the categories resulting from the content analysis was to bring them in 
an order from the more general to the more specific. In analogy to Rossi, Freeman, and Lipsey 
(1999, p. 432)2 it is possible to differentiate between (more) conceptual and (more) instrumental 
uses of evaluation standards.  
 Conceptual use means the variety of ways in which evaluation standards indirectly have 
an impact on evaluation as a theory and profession and on its recognition by society and 
politics, stimulating “the thinking about issues in general way.” Standards give an overall 
orientation about the goals and concepts of evaluation, are expressions of and references 
for evaluation theory and serve as a basis for reflection for the individual evaluator (or 
evaluation teams/units/communities) to think about his or her evaluation practice. 
 Instrumental use means the direct and observable use—here—of evaluation standards: 
they can serve as criteria for meta-evaluations; they can be the basis for evaluation 
training curricula and serve as self-instruction material; they can be refined as reference 
                                            
2 I use the dichotomy of Peter Rossi and his colleagues for classifying uses of evaluation standards; they use it for 
classifying uses of evaluation itself. 
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system for quality assurance—especially concerning collection and analysis of data; and 
they can serve as a tool for evaluation practice. 
 In between one could position two other uses, often mentioned by the respondents: 
Standards can enhance the legitimacy of evaluation in relation to the political system or 
civil society. They can support the willingness of public authorities and politicians to 
commission evaluations or—one step further—to ascribe evaluation a productive role in 
the democratic process. Standards can be a weighty point and a visible expression of 
professionalization of evaluation. They can support evaluation’s positioning vis-à-vis 
academic research and other professions as for instance accounting or quality 
management. 
Please don’t misunderstand me. What I try to do is a kind of descriptive mapping of the uses of 
evaluation standards. It is not an attempt to fulfil the need for empirical evidence on the extent of 
their conceptual and instrumental use. This topic in fact demands substantial research. Maybe 
you will soon hear about such empirical evidence reported in the EES standards working group. 
Different Standard Elements for Different Uses 
This picture of potential uses of evaluation standards makes it possible to untangle some of the 
arguments against standards though it does not mean to invalidate them. But maybe it is possible 
to gain new perspectives and find better solutions. 
If we see the different uses of evaluation standards—between the two poles ‘conceptual’ and 
‘instrumental’—it becomes obvious, that different elements of evaluation standards or guidelines 
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 The first core elements are the standards themselves. They are usually one to tree 
sentences long and express the desirable attributes of evaluations. These statements are in 
the centre of the French, the German and the U.K. codes and are called “standards” (CH, 
D), “principles” (F), or “guidelines” (GB). These texts are highly condensed and 
communicate a vision of ‘how sound evaluation should be.’ (The standards-statements 
themselves most clearly feed into the conceptual use of the sets of standards.) 
 A second core element is the introduction to these standard texts, providing some short 
information on the scope, the purpose and the intended uses of the paper. 
These two elements give a general orientation about evaluation and include central theoretical, 
ethical and methodological assumptions and principles. Although short and written in mostly 
non-technical language they are fully decodable primarily for evaluation specialists, evaluators 
or informed commissioners/stakeholders. If evaluation wants to communicate its vision und 
mission to the broader public it needs specific information formats which are—as far as I 
know—not available within the different evaluation societies. 
 A third element is a detailed commentary—about the standards text as a whole and also 
about each single standard. It addresses the emergence, the application and the future 
development of the text. The text explains key concepts—such as formative/summative, 
internal/external—and gives core definitions. This element, which easily comprises 20 or 
more pages, requires intensive reading and analysis.  
 A fourth element are illustrative cases for each of the single standards, examples of 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ evaluations which enable the readers to work through the texts and 
apprehend more complex and specific aspects. Only the Joint Committee (1994) 
standards include—all in all some 40—illustrative cases. They are often used in 
evaluation trainings and for many of the respondents of the DeGEval Online Survey such 
case examples would be the most valuable complement of a new edition. 
 The fifth element: practical tools derived from the standards using their structure and 
logic. The SEVAL and the DeGEval Standards have adopted the “functional table of 
contents” of the Joint Committee Book, showing how selected standards correspond to 
each evaluation task (from ‘Deciding Whether to Evaluate’ to “Reporting the 
Evaluation”). Checklists are also included within these three sets. 
 The sixth element is the only one which has a stronger prescriptive character so that it can 
serve as a possible starting point for quality assurance. (This element thus supports the 
most clearly instrumental use of the Standards.) The JCSEE give some six to ten 
prescriptive guidelines and also lists failures to avoid for each of its 30 single standards.3 
Evaluators can use these recommendations and warnings for checking their design and 
implementation; meta-evaluators find a detailed criteria list for evaluation. 
                                            
3 Some of the 60 statements of the UKES-Standards could be categorised as more prescriptive guidelines. 
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There are some clues in the DeGEval-survey that many of the respondents would like a standard 
book comprising all six elements—but some of them express the concern that this would be an 
effort overstretching the resources of the German evaluation society. 
Objections Seen from a Utilization Perspective 
Some of the arguments against standards mentioned earlier can be reframed by analysing the 
different elements of evaluation standards and their potential uses.  
A first assertion is that none of the above mentioned elements of the existing standard sets in 
evaluation is comparable to the minimum standards known from technology and industry. Even 
the “prescriptive guidelines” mentioned as a sixth element are far away from a “minimum 
standard” as known from the realm of quality assurance or engineering. Minimum standards 
should not be confused with “maximum standards” as they are widely used in evaluation 
standard sets. It is crucial to differentiate between these two types of standards: 
• A ‘minimum standard’ states, usually in rather technical terms, specific (ideally 
quantitatively operationalized) minimum requirements, which must be strictly fulfilled so 
that quality can be ascribed to the object. Minimum standards are strongly prescriptive. 
• A ‘maximum standard’ states, usually in everyday language open to interpretation, the 
envisioned ideal that an object should fulfil in order to be judged as good, high quality 
etc. Maximum standards give orientation. 
Objection g) —standards as an impediment to innovation—is certainly a realistic concern for the 
case of minimum standards. Texts such as the evaluation principles, guidelines or principles 
are—in all their elements—clearly based on maximum standards, where innovations are a built-
in feature, as for example the UKES Standards express very clearly:  
The guidelines are prescriptive only in the sense that they rehearse what those 
engaged in the practical business of evaluation, from whatever perspective, have 
found to be both an honourable and effective way of interacting. We believe the 
guidance will come alive through use in the discussions and negotiations between 
people involved in evaluations. As such we hope the statements will promote 
conversation about evaluation in general but also support ways of negotiating 
some of the critical aspects of the evaluation process from commissioning to 
dissemination of evaluation findings  
So I think that one of the objections can be explained by a misunderstanding about the nature of 
maximum standards. This makes evident how important it is to define key terms very clearly. 
Objection f)—standard sets often include single standards that contradict each other—for at least 
a part can be reframed using the concept of maximum standards. These are loosely defined 
statements leaving space for interpretation, negotiation and concretisation depending on the 
specific purpose of the evaluation in question and the situational context. For example, at least 
two of the four standards groups of the JCSEE Standards—feasibility and accuracy—in the real 
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world of evaluation, may in rare cases both be met for 100 percent. Very often compromises will 
be necessary. There is a certain probability that a ‘perfect’ in the sense of non-contradictory set 
of standards would indeed impede innovation within our lively profession. But nevertheless: 
avoidable contradictions of standards should be removed so that they give the most possible 
clear guidance. 
Objection e)—there is no standard set which is suitable to all audiences—is true and is not true 
as we can see now. As any communication and any report of a given evaluation have to be 
precisely adapted to the information needs and capacities of the intended users, so it is the same 
for evaluation standards. Different elements of a standards textbook are relevant more or less for 
diverse user groups. If evaluation wants to reach the general public special formats are required 
additionally.  
Objection d)—no obligation of clients/commissioners/public officials to work with evaluation 
findings—this is a really long-lasting complaint at evaluators’ meetings and in evaluation 
literature. It should become clear that evaluation standards strive for conceptual utilisation by 
decision makers, public administrators and also politicians. They are a framework within which 
to negotiate evaluation tenders, re-negotiate evaluation designs and evaluations questions, 
prepare public presentations of findings, shape communication strategies to disseminate findings, 
conclusions and may be competing recommendations. I believe maximum standards can 
strengthen the role of evaluators, give a professional backing for conflict situations and by the 
way support the process of democratic decision making. 
Objection c)—no unique standard set is adequate for different kinds of evaluation—is also to be 
taken seriously. It is obvious that the perspectives of external evaluators (and to some extent also 
of commissioners of external evaluations) are well represented within the standard sets. Needs 
and requirements of internal evaluation, peer-evaluation and self evaluation could be further 
addressed within the standards or at least its supplementary documents. Maybe internal and self-
evaluators are not so well represented on the boards and standards-related standing working 
groups of national evaluation societies so that it could be necessary to initiate activities in this 
direction. 
There are already examples of how to enlarge the scope of standards to these kinds of evaluation. 
The UKES guidelines from the very beginning include a section with 17 guidelines for 
institutional self-evaluation. The DeGEval-Standards will be supplemented by 
“recommendations to apply the standards on evaluation in self-evaluation.”4 
I would like to address now objection b)—the value topic in evaluation standards—in more 
detail and leave argumentation on objection a)—mismatch of standards to distinct democratic 
systems—to further discussions. But I am sure that reflections about values in evaluation could 
also inform the discussion about the applicability for diverse democratic systems. Nonetheless 
                                            
4 There is a draft version of these recommendations now which will be discussed and most likely ratified by the 
DeGEval general assembly in November 2004. 
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the latter point needs more research and discussion—that could be a topic to be tackled by the 
European evaluation community. 
Evaluation Standards and Values in Democracy 
The objection that evaluation standards do not adequately handle value questions is a substantial 
point of argument. As democratic governance has at its core the struggle of diverse interests and 
values, the representation of values becomes crucial when applying standards to evaluations of 
public policies. 
The four evaluation standard sets mention values in a more or less implicit manner. Both the 
UKES and the SFE papers touch upon them by demanding that different stakeholder 
perspectives should be taken into account.5 The SEVAL and the DeGEval-Standards U5 
“Transparency of Values” approach the topic more explicitly: While the SEVAL-Standards—in 
the tradition of the respective JCSEE-Standard U4—focus on interpretation of findings, the 
DeGEval-Standard U5 expands the call for transparency of values to all phases of an evaluation: 
The perspectives and assumptions of the stakeholders that serve as a basis for the 
evaluation and the interpretation of the evaluation findings shall be described in a 
way that clarifies their underlying values. 
Within the short commentary given there is a first hint concerning the nature of values: 
Interpretation of the collected information and findings in the final phase is one of 
the most important and critical parts of the evaluation process. Societal values 
(norms) necessarily play a major role in this. The underlying values shall be as 
transparent as possible so that interpretation is convincing, comprehensible and 
assessable. 
As an expansion for any evaluation standard set it could be helpful do define the concept of 
values. This would be in accordance with the function of standards to define generic key terms 
and to support communication about evaluation concepts. 
There are many suggestions in the evaluation literature, especially in the writings of Ernest 
House who has discussed the topic since the middle 70s. Following Campbell he describes 
‘assertions on facts’ (factual claims) as central for the planning and execution of evaluations and 
supplements these with “value claims.”  
Descriptively, values could be defined as belief-based preferences of individuals and collectives 
to favour distinct settings or solutions over others. Values—normatively seen—express demands 
put forth to other individuals, to collectives and to the democratic powers, as well as demands to 
make distinct choices. Thus, the normative function of values is to argue and to enforce that 
                                            
5 SFE: “L’évaluation prend en compte de façon équilibrée les différents points de vue légitimes qui ont été exprimés 
sur l'action évaluée.” UKES: “The guidelines provide a reference point from different perspectives for a range of 
stakeholders involved in the evaluation process.” 
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specific preferred alternatives are to be selected. Evaluation in the context of democratic 
governance should make transparent how it handles such value claims. 
Ernest House complains that value claims and factual claims are melted and mixed up in 
evaluation again and again. Therefore, he demands that we develop systematic procedures to 
collect and analyse claims that include strong value aspects, so that evaluative conclusions are 
not being biased by underlying implicit value claims. (House/Howe 1999, 313) 
Michael Scriven recently underlined his position that value clarification is a definitional element 
of professional evaluation: 
The core of this package consists of the techniques that are involved in the 
systematic and objective validation of evaluative claims which is the dictionary 
definition of evaluation with two qualifiers in front of that to narrow it down to 
professionally competent evaluation (Donaldson & Scriven, 2003, p. 30) 
But—is there really a consensus in evaluation—to incorporate values clarification into the 
evaluation process? Or would we be in danger of privileging—by way of the Trojan Horse 
“Values Clarification”—some evaluation traditions and to exclude others that are very sceptical 
with regard to values as the driving force of the evaluation process? For example Rossi and 
colleagues (Rossi, Freeman, & Lipsey, 1999, p. 422) take the position—being fully aware of the 
post-modern criticisms: 
…that disagreements among researchers on empirical findings are mainly matters 
of methods or measurement error rather than matters involving different 
truths…Indeed the message of this book is how to choose the best method for a 
given research question that is likely to produce the most credible findings.  
From my point of view I have no doubt at all that Rossi, Freeman, and Lipsey (1999), Thomas 
Cook (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002) or James Heckman (Heckman & Smith, 1996) and 
many others who advocate methods-driven evaluation, as well as Ernest House, Bob Stake, 
Michael Scriven and many others who push the values envelope, all have honourable motives to 
take their stance on how evaluation should handle the value question—a question that 
accompanies evaluation since its early roots at the beginning of the 20th century. This is—as I 
mentioned in the beginning—a value claim of evaluation itself and it should be handled with 
great circumspection. 
If standards for evaluation are not to be silent at this point—which would offend postmodernist 
thinkers—or if they take the stance that values are the advance organisers of any evaluation 
effort—which could enrage another fraction of methodologists, what can be done?  
The UKES-Standards that strive for “both an honourable and effective way of interacting” give a 
very important piece of advice: 
There is no evaluation stance for which these guidelines are inappropriate or 
inapplicable. Many of the statements have at their heart the need to be open and 
transparent about the expectations and requirements of all the stakeholders 
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whoever they may be. As such the language used has striven to avoid hidden or 
tacit assumptions about the efficacy, dominance or normality of any single 
approach to evaluation. 
I would like to make a modest proposal which does not provide a solution but which could help 
clarify the values topic for the evaluation community and for its audiences in politics and society. 
F so that it becomes transparent how distinct evaluations deal with the values issue so that 
stakeholders can adequately use findings, conclusions and recommendations. 
The following statement or a similar one could be included in an evaluation standards paper: 
Evaluators should make explicit how they handle competing interests and values 
shaping the evaluation design and guiding the presentation of their findings and 
interpretations, especially whether they include or exclude value clarification into 
the evaluation process and whether their evaluation models adhere to specific 
values or rather see all values as of equal rank. 
Evaluation models can be ordered along two dimensions: values inclusion versus exclusion and 
equivalency of all values versus preferential treatment of distinct values.  
... privilege distinct 
values




exclude values                                include values
...from/to the evaluation process
Evaluation models 







Evaluation models categorised as they consider values
 
The following outline of the four main types is succinct and is no substitute for thorough 
analysis.6 Categorisation is guided by the evaluation model’s consciousness of values.7 
                                            
6 An initial systematic portrayal is found in Beywl et al. (2004), dealing primarily with evaluations of poverty 
avoidance and social inclusion policies and programmes. 
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Commonly there are overlaps between categories, which result from ambiguities in model 
descriptions, particularly when the subject of values is merely treated implicitly. 
 Values-distanced approaches follow the tradition of thinkers such as Max Weber or 
Karl Popper and eliminate value judgements from the evaluation process. Theoretical 
framing of an evaluation and implementation in empirical investigations operate 
‘objectively’ according to strict rules; the utilisation of evaluation findings is delegated to 
the external and public democratic processes which align them with their own competing 
values. 
 Values-positioned approaches explicitly assume that societies are marked by stark power 
imbalances and social and economic inequality. Evaluations should counterbalance the 
value hegemony in the political and cultural spheres by strengthening the weak and 
giving them an audible voice in the political process. 
 Values-prioritising models also assume disequilibria in the power distribution of 
stakeholders, but restrict themselves to making them transparent and accessible to the 
negotiation of particularly relevant/socially accepted values. For instance, they may 
demand involvement of all stakeholders in the determination of questions and discussion 
of findings and may work toward prioritisation and a minimum consensus. 
 Values-relativistic models underscore the dominant significance of values in planning, 
executing and utilising evaluations. They detect value conflicts in all phases and maintain 
existing tensions without taking sides or making pragmatic compromise. Motivation and 
social energy in using evaluation findings derive from consciously and publicly stated 
differences in values and interests among stakeholders. 
I will not go into the details of this classification, which owes much to Daniel Stufflebeam 
(2001) on evaluation models, which takes a distinctly normative position, which I try to avoid. 
Unquestionably there are many mixtures and overlaps regarding the four categories in the real 
world of evaluation. The following table gives an idea of how one could assign several well 
known evaluation models to the four categories—this one does not claim to have mutually 




                                                                                                                                             
7 Assignments are not performed analytically, by maintaining, for instance, that cost-benefit analyses are bound ipso 
facto to the value judgements of shareholders (a stakeholder subgroup) or that goal-free evaluations mainly reflect 
values that are widespread in society (thus confirming the value hierarchy). Such mutually critical analyses form the 
nucleus of the ‘paradigmatic debates’ in evaluation methodology (Guba and Lincoln, 1997; Pawson and Tilley, 
1997; Philosophies and types of evaluation research authored by Eliot Stern in VET. 
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Evaluation models and how they take into account values 
Values consideration Chapter Generic name of the model Synonyms 
2.3.1.1 objectives-focused effectiveness studies 
2.3.1.2/3 (quasi) experimental design 
focused gold standard 
2.3.1.4 cost-benefit- focused cost-effectiveness  
2.3.1.5 context-mechanism focused  realistic/realist evaluation 
1. values distanced 
2.3.1.6 program-theory focused theory-driven evaluation 
2.3.2.1 issues focused responsive  2. values relativistic 
2.3.2.2 Dialog focused  constructivist/fourth generation  
2.3.3.1 decision focused accountability oriented 
2.3.3.2 utilisation focused pragmatic  
3. values prioritising 
2.3.3.3 stakeholder interests focused deliberative democratic  
4. values positioned 2.3.4.1 self organisation focused  empowerment evaluation 
My idea is that a high degree of transparency about how distinct evaluations treat the question of 
values can support credibility, integrity and propriety of evaluation as a profession. 
Outlook 
It is my belief that evaluation needs support and backup to strengthen its role in the changing 
European democracies. Maybe standards are promising to shape a European evaluation identity 
based on diversity. 
I stand up decidedly for evaluation standards that win the support of a wide variety of national 
societies and organizations, many different democratic thinking traditions, and a wide range of 
evaluation cultures. The standards should be applicable to all public policy arenas. And they 
should also apply to private and third sector programmes and organisations as well. Such a 
document should be supported by evaluation professionals as well as by evaluation 
commissioners. Some parts of the text should be written in a language that is accessible to 
journalists so that it can be communicated to the general public.  
The existing texts on standards, principles and guidelines of evaluation in Europe have a broad 
range of common understanding which could be extended. 
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My vision is a cohesive body of evaluation standards, guidelines or principles developed with 
active participation of evaluators and evaluation users from a wide range of countries and policy 
fields, with diverse evaluation cultures and methodologies in mind. A short paper comprising 
essential statements should be supplemented by explanations, definitions and commentaries, 
making explicit evaluation theory and evaluative thinking. The book or online data base I have in 
mind would also include practical tools derived from the standards, such as checklists or working 
grids. Well written illustrative cases should be included, especially for teaching evaluation and 
self-instruction of interested parties to open the readers’ minds for deeper understanding of 
evaluation knowledge, methods and performance. 
Such a body of text derived from the existing standards, guidelines and principles could be 
supportive in making evaluation trustworthy and visible as an essential part of democratic 
governance. 
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